University of Chicago Law School

Chicago Unbound
Coase-Sandor Working Paper Series in Law and Coase-Sandor Institute for Law and Economics
Economics
2009

Heller's Gridlock Economy in Perspective: Why There Is Too Little,
Not Too Much, Private Property
Richard A. Epstein
dangelolawlib+richardepstein@gmail.com

Follow this and additional works at: https://chicagounbound.uchicago.edu/law_and_economics
Part of the Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Richard A. Epstein, "Heller's Gridlock Economy in Perspective: Why There Is Too Little, Not Too Much,
Private Property" (John M. Olin Program in Law and Economics Working Paper No. 495, 2009).

This Working Paper is brought to you for free and open access by the Coase-Sandor Institute for Law and
Economics at Chicago Unbound. It has been accepted for inclusion in Coase-Sandor Working Paper Series in Law
and Economics by an authorized administrator of Chicago Unbound. For more information, please contact
unbound@law.uchicago.edu.

CHICAGO
JOHN M. OLIN LAW & ECONOMICS WORKING PAPER NO. 495
(2D SERIES)

Heller’s Gridlock Economy in Perspective:
Why There Is Too Little, Not Too Much,
Private Property
Richard A. Epstein

THE LAW SCHOOL
THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO
November 2009
This paper can be downloaded without charge at:
The Chicago Working Paper Series Index: http://www.law.uchicago.edu/Lawecon/index.html
and at the Social Science Research Network Electronic Paper Collection.

Heller’s Gridlock Economy in Perspective:
Why There Is Too Little, Not Too Much, Private Property

Richard A. Epstein*
Abstract
This Article critiques Michael Heller’s important contribution in the Gridlock
Economy. At no point does it take the position that gridlock, or the associated
anticommons, is not a serious issue in the design of a legal system. But it does insist
that gridlock is not the major source of social dislocation, or that private ownership
is the major source of gridlock. More concretely, the articles examines the other
important sources of economic distortion that are unrelated to economic gridlock
from private action. These include the use of excessive government subsidies (as
with health care), misguided government licenses (as with broadcast licenses); the
unwise use of government power to create gridlock situations (as with employment
law); the excessive role of government permitting (as with real estate
development); and the use of creative private techniques to overcome gridlock (as
with patent licensing as a way to combat the patent thicket). Thereafter, the Article
explains how traditional common law rules did a better job in controlling for
gridlock than many current initiatives, by narrowly defining the class of actionable
harms to exclude competitive loss, blocked views, and hurt feelings. It closes with
an explanation of how broad definitions of harm slow down decisions in the public
sector, thereby impeding the use of the eminent domain power that could otherwise
respond to gridlock issues.

*

James Parker Hall Distinguished Service Professor of Law, The University of Chicago, the Peter
and Kirsten Bedford Senior Fellow, The Hoover Institution, visiting professor of law, New York
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The topic of this conference is Michael Heller’s provocative new book on The
Gridlock Economy.1 The central thesis of the book is that one critical obstacle to
overall social advancement is the fragmentation of property among private owners
that prevents its coherent assembly for projects that are desired by all but
achievable by none. There is no question that, more than anyone else, Heller has put
this topic on the map in its current form, chiefly through two earlier academic
articles which have had immense influence on the field.2 The ability to introduce
into the mature field of law and economics even a single new generative term, the
anticommons on which Gridlock is based, is a major intellectual achievement. What
makes this accomplishment so noteworthy is that it now seems obvious—but only
after the fact. The question of holdout has long been on the agenda, but the ability to
link this problem up with the issue of overconsumption of shared resources—or
commons—opens up previously unappreciated avenues for research. We thus
know that with any standardized models the losses that come from excessive
fragmentation of productive assets, or tragedies of the anticommons, are equal to
those which come from the excessive use of common resources over which there are
no clear property rights, or tragedies of the commons.3 Today, no assessment of
complex social institutions and practices can be undertaken without thinking about
its anticommons implications. Gridlock is here to stay; not only in discussions about
traffic, but also in those about the economy writ large.
But wherein lies the source of this gridlock? Heller’s subtitle offers us one
possible answer: How Too Much Ownership Wrecks Markets, Stops Innovation, and
Costs Lives.4 Sometimes the strong protection of private property rights is a source
1

MICHAEL HELLER, THE GRIDLOCK ECONOMY: HOW TOO MUCH OWNERSHIP WRECKS
MARKETS, STOPS INNOVATION, AND COSTS LIVES (2008).
2
Michael A. Heller, The Tragedy of the Anticommons: Property in the Transition from Marx to
Markets, 111 HARV. L. REV. 621 (1998). For its application to patents, see Michael A. Heller &
Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Can Patents Deter Innovation? The Anticommons in Biomedical Research,
280 SCI. 698 (1998).
3
See, e.g., James M. Buchanan & Yong J. Yoon, Symmetric Tragedies: Commons and
Anticommons, 43 J. L. ECON. 1 (2000) (modeling the formal “symmetry” between overutilization
and underutilization).
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HELLER, supra note XX.
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of genuine economic stagnation and dislocation. However, any close examination of
the issues reveals one larger truth that lacks the attention‐grabbing character of
Heller’s title. In most settings, the weak and indefinite property rights system is the
source of the gridlock that he rightly deplores. We do not need another indignant
attack on the vulnerable institution of private property.

We need a greater

appreciation of how unbridled government power does just what Heller says:
“wrecks markets, stops innovation, and costs lives.”
The purpose of this critique of Heller is to illumine the true sources of the
gridlock problem. In so doing, I hope to avoid moving to the alternative scheme of
insisting that private property is the “be‐all and end‐all” of sound legal regulations
of the economy. Quite the contrary, for many years I have taken the position that we
can identify an optimal mix of private and public property, one that is often achieved
by customary practices that arises out of the countless actions of unrelated
individual persons, but which sometimes depends on state action for their reliable
implementation. The fundamental trade‐off that has to be made in all cases lies in
balancing the holdout problems that drive the formation of the gridlock economy
and the exclusion problems that arise under any private property arrangement.5
The proper balance cannot be determined in the abstract, but rather requires a close
look at the nature of a particular resource to figure out what system of rights
maximizes the value in using that resource. Stated in this fashion, it becomes clear
that gridlock is only one important piece of the overall puzzle. Gridlock neither
displaces nor subsumes the other institutional or social problems that stand in the
path of efficient resource allocation.
To set the stage for this analysis, it is important to stress at the outset one
assumption that Heller and myself share. We both think that by and large
competitive markets offer the best hope for social prosperity and technological
advancement. That is why his indictment insists that too much ownership “wrecks
5

See RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, PRINCIPLES FOR A FREE SOCIETY: RECONCILING INDIVIDUAL
LIBERTY WITH THE COMMON GOOD 251-78 (1998); Richard A. Epstein, On the Optimal Mix of
Common and Private Property, 11 SOC. PHIL. & POL’Y 17, 20 (1994).
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[competitive] markets,” which are by implication a good thing.

Indeed, Heller is

surely correct in thinking that a need for efficient and responsive markets generates
a grim view of the holdout problems that arise when property rights are configured
in ways that do not facilitate high rates of transactions relative to transaction costs.
It is therefore appropriate to begin this essay with a recapitulation of the reasons to
fear gridlock in social relations.
Once the reasons to fear gridlock are presented, however, it is necessary to
put them into perspective, for Heller overplays their severity. More concretely,
Heller makes at least five interrelated mistakes in The Gridlock Economy. He tends
to either downgrade or ignore other sources of distortion in the economy. First he
ignores the freefall economy that arises from unwise government subsidies that
produce extensive economic distortions. Second, he tends to misclassify issues as
gridlock problems when their genesis lies elsewhere. In this instance, the chief
error comes in his account of the evolution of property rights in the broadcast
spectrum. Third, he ignores those key situations where government power is used
to create gridlock, not end it. Employment relations, in both nonunion and union
contexts, are the dominant source of this problem. Fourth, he tends to ignore the
dangerous role that excessive government permitting plays in throttling effective
economic development. The use of natural resources, such as land and water for
example, suffers grievously from such permitting. Lastly, even when gridlock does
occur due to some distinctive configuration of private property, Heller underrates
the tools that are available to control that risk. Intellectual property law offers some
instructive illustrations.
I. Why Gridlock?
Early on in Gridlock, Heller sets out, complete with map, the gridlock that developed
with respect to transportation over the Rhine River during the late Middle Ages.6
Rivers were, as a matter of both Roman and common law, common property to
6

HELLER, supra note XX, at 3.
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which all had access and over which no one person could exercise dominion.7 The
logic behind this was that the value of the river lay in its “going concern” as a river in
which multiple simultaneous uses were possible, only one of which was private
consumption. One of the desired uses was transportation down the river which
requires property rights of a sort—“rules of the road”—which allow the traffic to
move efficiently in a crowded space. But, in early times, letting anyone use the river
maximized its value for transportation, especially when the use levels were
sufficiently low that crowding and pollution did not require public expenditures.
The elaborate construction of toll stations along the Rhine River was a mortal threat
to commerce along the river. But it is critical to note that they were not created by
private action, nor validated by any conception of the private or customary law.
Rather the proliferation of toll booths laid in the fragmented state of political power
in Germany at the time, which was controlled by local princes, not a single national
government.8 Indeed, in medieval times, the distinction between the prince as
owner of property and as sovereign was not as clear as it has become today. But it is
clear that all gridlock along the Rhine must be chalked up to the high politics of rival
sovereigns, not petty disputes of rival owners. The point is evident from the full title
of the treaty which identifies the relevant parties in its title: “Treaty of Westphalia:
Peace Treaty between the Holy Roman Emperor and the King of France and their
respective Allies.”9

The successful political under the Treaty of Westphalia,

moreover, unlocked the use of the Rhine to support an extensive commercial traffic
by a resort to the customary law that precede the government interventions on the
point, which is evident from its own language that reads as follow: “and the antient
Security, Jurisdiction and Custom, such as have been long before these Wars in use,
7

J. INST. 2.1.1–5 (J. Moyle trans., 5th ed. 1913) (“[A]ll of these things are by natural law
common to all: air, flowing water, the sea and, consequently, the shores of the sea.”). This
persists to the modern day in the doctrine of the navigation servitude. See, e.g., United States v.
Willow River Power co., 324 U.S. 499 (1945)(no compensation owed when construction of dam
on a navigable river impairs operation of a mill on a nonnavigable fork).
8
Roy Gardner, Noel Gaston & Robert T. Masson, Tolling the Rhine in 1254: Complementary
Monopoly Revisited 2-6 (2002), http://www.indiana.edu/~workshop/papers/gardner_102802.pdf.
9
The Treaty itself explicitly prohibits tolls in two sections. Treaty of Westphalia, Holy Rom.
Emp.Fr.,
art.
LXIX,
LXXXIX
(Oct.
14,
1648),
available
at
http://avalon.law.yale.edu/17th_century/westphal.asp.
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shall be re‐establish'd and inviolably maintain'd in the Provinces, Ports and
Rivers.”10
A simple game‐theoretical evaluation provides some estimation of the
undeniable magnitude of the gridlock problem. Each sovereign acts on its own
initiative and cares only for its own well‐being. Putting a toll booth across the Rhine
allows it to raise revenues that it could not collect if it just let the traffic go by.11 It
also cuts down on the volume of the traffic, so that overall use of the river is lower
than it was before. The individual duchy or potentate, moreover, does not take into
account any impact that the loss in traffic will have on upstream and downstream
owners. These parties of course have the same option as the original party; they can
each put a toll booth across the river and charge fees. Each party in turn gains from
its action but inflicts costs on others of greater magnitude. There were 30 toll
bridges or so across the Rhine. Suppose each one would allow an owner a one‐time
increment to income from his own toll operation of 15 percent, but expose all other
castle owners to a 5 percent loss of existing stock so that in the end each party gets
1.15 x 0.9529, which measures the loss from a five percent decrement on 29 repeat
plays. It is clear without the math that the cumulative loss leaves all owners worse
off after the game has run its course than if no tolls had been imposed at all. After
all, each blockader would find it impossible to ship its own goods any distance along
the river. So we have an n‐person prisoner’s dilemma game in which defection
triumphs when cooperation is desperately needed.
There is, however, nothing about the basic problem that depends upon the
physical configuration of this or that river. Modern markets also have complex
distribution chains, and it is more than coincidence that in these settings we speak
of upstream and downstream parties. The reasoning is the same as with the Rhine
example. If each party holds a monopoly position over its stage of production, the
effort to extract sequential monopoly rents leads to a virtual shut down of the entire
10

The Treaty itself explicitly prohibits tolls in two sections. See Id. art. LXIX, LXXXIX
I ignore alternative gains that could have been captured by selling goods and services to the
river traffic.
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market because of the cumulative impact of success noncooperative behaviors.
Technically speaking these conditions generate what is termed a double‐
marginalization problem. The math is not all that important, but the consequences
are. Even just two sequential monopolies result in huge social losses relative to a
single monopoly. Additional stages of potential blockade only further compound the
problem. However, the economic response is one of vertical integration, whereby
the multiple firms become one.

At that point both the monopolist and the

consumers do better off than they did before. Put another way, whenever the
factors of production are arrayed in series (like electrical circuits), the risk of
blockades requires some kind of collective response. The greater the number of
parties, the greater the risk that is faced.
The increase in the number of parties takes on a very different significance
when the parties do not operate in series like the castles on the Rhine, but in
parallel, such that each one becomes a substitute source of production or service to
the others. Now the right response is, the more the merrier. To see how this works,
assume that the only question is how to get from one side of the Rhine to the other.
Assume further that these same castles each control one bridge over the river. Now
the closer the proximity of these bridges and the greater their number, the more
efficient the market operates, because each bridge offers an additional substitute for
the others. The only locational advantage that one bridge has over the other is the
differential cost of transportation from any given location to any given bridge. It
follows that the calculations made above go into reverse. Now the greater the
number of bridges, the more competitive the market. There is of course no duty to
compete, but with free entry we should expect a realization of all the gains
obtainable from expanding the range of market options. Gridlock poses problems
that competitive markets solve, but everything depends on how the resources are
arrayed.

7

II. The Free Fall Economy
Gridlock may be one important problem, but it is not the only impediment to
the sound operation of competitive markets. A second distortion in markets comes
not from paralysis but from excessive consumption wrought by unprincipled
subsidies doled out by government agencies. This problem is best understood as
the inverse of a gridlock problem. Far from being caught in a traffic snarl, the “free‐
fall economy” runs downhill at ever greater speeds without the benefit of the brake
normally supplied by the price system in a well‐functioning market. The normal
competitive processes are distorted by government intervention reducing the costs
of production. The result of this subsidy is excessive production of certain goods, at
least until the market collapses when the extra demand is no longer sustainable.
The instances of this mistake are not insignificant. Consider just three here:
Medicare and Medicaid, the ethanol fiasco, and the subprime crisis. The most salient
feature about Medicare and Medicaid is their inexorable increase in costs, which is
hardly a sign of blockade tying up needed health care resources. Rather, the age‐old
question is how to limit demand for goods that are sold at or near a zero price.
Medicare generates this problem in how it prices goods to eligible members,
typically over 65. To be sure, there are some modest fees for access to medical
services, but these are insufficient to cover the entire cost. In the case of Medicare
Part B, the enrollee’s fees for professional services cover about 25 percent of the
total bill, which implies a huge subsidy.12 Worse still, the program is structured as a
lump sum payment, independent of age and risk, so that the marginal cost for
additional units of medical services is close to zero. Using non‐price techniques to
ration care—limiting the choice of physician, blocking access to certain types of
treatment—generates a huge public uproar, so that the various short term reform
strategies are quickly overwhelmed. Gridlock is not the issue. Free‐fall is.
12

“[A] 25-75 [coverage] ratio . . . applies generally to persons who enroll in Medicare Part B to
get coverage of doctors' fees, diagnostic tests, and other outpatient services.” Richard L. Kaplan
et al., Retirees at Risk: The Precarious Promise of Post-Employment Health Benefits, 9 YALE J.
HEALTH POL'Y L. & ETHICS 287, 345 (2009) (citing 2009 MEDICARE HANDBOOK § 6.02[C][1], at
6-10 (Judith A. Stein & Alfred J. Chiplin, Jr. eds., 2009)).
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Similarly, the huge booms and busts in the ethanol markets are not a function
of gridlock. Their occurrence is a function of the free‐fall economy driven by large
subsidies for using ethanol as a fuel. These subsidies have distorted international
trade markets, as American producers have been largely successful in getting
Congress—that paladin of free markets—to impose heavy tariffs on foreign
importation in order to preserve a free field to American producers. 13 It is unclear
whether Heller classifies tariffs as an element in gridlock. Regardless, the resultant
malaise is surely not the consequence of “too much ownership.” However classified,
tariff protection from foreign competition has led to systematic shortages in the
grain supply used for food in the domestic and export markets14—before the sector
was devastated in the financial meltdown which had its origins in . . . the subprime
crisis.
The subprime financial crisis, and its massive aftermath, is yet another
illustration of the free‐fall economy. The episode did not start with paralysis in any
observable market; brokers generally know how to arrange for loans and to sell
properties. However, they and their customers respond to incentives, including the
large infusion of cheap money that the Federal Reserve pumped into the market,
and to the constant insistence by Congress that FANNIE MAE and FREDDIE MAC
guarantee loans to high‐risk borrowers who lack the resources to repay. Cheap
money allows people to bid up the price of housing to unsustainable levels until no
greater fool can be found, at which point the market collapses like a house of
cards.15 To be sure, cheap money and imprudent government guarantees do not
account for all the failings of the financial system. Indeed, the unprecedented level
and complexity of securitization of these subprime mortgages could easily have
13

For a critical take on the politics, see Kevin Allison & Stephanie Kirchgaessner, From Hope to
Husk, FIN. TIMES, Oct. 22, 2008, at 9.
14
For impacts of the increased production of biofuels on the food crisis, see THE WORLD BANK,
RISING FOOD PRICES: POLICY OPTIONS AND WORLD BANK RESPONSE (2008), available at
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/NEWS/Resources/risingfoodprices_backgroundnote_apr08.pdf
15
See, for an account, JOHN B. TAYLOR, GETTING OFF TRACK: HOW GOVERNMENT ACTIONS
AND INTERVENTIONS CAUSED, PROLONGED, AND WORSENED THE FINANCIAL CRISIS 3-5 (2009),
with graphs depicting the reduced housing supply if the “Taylor rule” on money supply had been
followed.
9

added fuel to the fire by creating a crisis in valuation once the bubble burst in the
underlying assets. The resulting distress is plausibly linked to mark‐to‐market (or,
to accountants, “fair‐value”) valuation techniques, which involve periodic
reevaluation of unsold assets to market prices. In all, these techniques may have
generated the downward cascades that overwhelmed all the (marginal) protections
that the investment banks built into the initial financial models.16

However,

regardless of how one treats the various valuation techniques for these assets,
gridlock was not the source of distress. Put otherwise, excessive volatility can be as
deadly as excessive stalemate. To talk about the one without the other is to deny the
complexity of what really goes on in “the” economy as a whole.
III. Insufficient Property Rights: The Broadcast Spectrum
Aside from ignoring the major issues discussed above, Heller also
misclassifies as gridlock problems matters that are better treated under other
rubrices. The chief illustration of this problem is his analysis of the broadcast
spectrum, which has been subject to inefficient allocation over its entire history. In
dealing with this issue, Heller makes the bald claim that “[o]ver 90 percent of
[airwaves are] dead air because ownership of broadcast spectrum is so
fragmented.”17 The factual predicate is true (or at least true enough) as is evident
from a graph of spectrum utilization, which shows steep peaks of intensive use
interspersed with areas of virtually no use at all.18 The obvious resource loss in this
scenario is the underexploited portions of the spectrum which, if put into private
hands through auction, are worth billions of dollars. The question for Heller is how
to squeeze this manifest resource failure into his gridlock model.

16

Unfortunately,

For my view, see Richard A. Epstein & M. Todd Henderson, Marking to Market: Can
Accounting Rules Shake the Foundations of Capitalism (U of Chicago Law & Econ., Olin
Working
Paper,
No.
458,
2009),
available
at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1385382.
17
HELLER, supra note XX, at xiii.
18
For discussion, see Thomas W. Hazlett, Spectrum Tragedies, 22 YALE J. ON REG. 242, 248
fig.1 & n.28 (2005).
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that cannot be credibly done. Far from fragmented ownership, the spectrum has
one owner. But it is the wrong owner. It is the United States.
To see how this came about requires some historical account of the rules that
govern the acquisition of property rights under a private and public law approach.
The common law and Roman law approaches both start with this obvious limitation:
there is no state, as such, which can confer to particular individuals title to that
which is unowned in the state of nature. I have already indicated that, with respect
to mixed commons (like water, with both collective and private uses), the customary
legal solutions all placed limitations on the ability, first of riparians, and then of
other individuals, to extract water from the river. In those contexts, taking initial
possession was the only way to reduce water to private ownership, but there were
clear customary limits on the amount of water that could be removed from the river
by that technique. With respect to land, animals, and chattel, those limitations were
removed so that the acquisition of a res nullius, or an ownerless thing, went to the
first possessor who was vested with ownership rights from top to bottom, i.e. from
the center of the earth to the heavens, or ad coelum et ad inferos.19 The key feature
of these rights was that they carried not only the right to exclude but also extensive
rights of use and of disposition. Use rights confer value and alienation rights allow
the asset to move from low to high value uses by a variety of techniques—from
outright sales, to partial sales (measured either by space or time), to joint ventures.
The initial system of property rights thus built in a dynamic element that allowed
for the voluntary reconfiguration of rights in light of new technical possibilities and
market opportunities.

Much of the common law in these circumstances is to

facilitate exchange by the use of deeds and recordation that firmed up the
transaction between the parties and gave notice to the rest of the world.20 It is this
system of transfer that can, on some occasions, lead to excessive fragmentation.
19

See, e.g., Pierson v. Post, 3 Cai. 175 (N.Y. Sup. 1805) (ownership of a wild animal goes to its
first possessor); Pile v. Pedrick, 31 A. 646 (Penn. 1895) (recognizing right to exclude subsurface
encroachment of only a few inches).
20
For my view of the increased freedom offered by recordation of servitudes, see Richard A.
Epstein, Notice and Freedom of Contract in the Law of Servitudes, 55 S. CAL. L. REV. 1353
(1982).
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Heller explores this capacity in the context of an inheritance regime that treats the
next generation as tenants in common of the whole—a practice which often reflect
the limitations of familial or tribal concerns.21 It bears noting that in these contexts
primogeniture is often an effective strategy that concentrates effective management
skills in land in the eldest son.

But the true effectiveness of that strategy is

measured in part by the ability to impose charges, secured by the property for the
benefit of other children who therefore receive financial support even they do not
retain a control interest in the property. It is only with the proliferation of multiple
interests in land that these sharing arrangements can be achieved without
debilitating compromises in control. Other types of arrangements, may be needed
to structure complex commercial ventures which are not subject to the equitable
constraints that control the distribution of wealth within the family, and these too
are only make possible by property regimes that organize divided interests in land.
As applied to the broadcast spectrum, the first question is whether the
system of land rights (which extends to the skies) is sufficient to blockade any and
all use of the overall system. In practice, everyone who faced this problem before
Heller agreed that landowner blockades of spectrum transmission or air travel was
a dead social loser.22 So the question was how best to avoid that result. The usual
rule was to “redefine” the property rights so that they extended only to the level of
effective occupation from the ground, and no higher.23 That redefinition strategy,
however, carries with it real costs in that it paves the way for other arbitrary state
redefinitions that might not prove to be so socially beneficial. Therefore, in this
potential gridlock area, it is correct to create a distinct set of spectrum rights, but to
do sounder test that is more restrictive of government power than simply a

21

HELLER, supra note XX, at 123-25..
This idea is illustrated by the early case law on air flight path trespasses. See, e.g., Hinman v.
Pacific Air Transport, 84 F.2d 755, 758 (9th Cir. 1936) (calling it “utterly impracticable” that “the
law should uphold attempts of landowners to stake out, or assert claims to indefinite, unused
spaces in the air”).
23
Hinman, 84 F.2d 755, 758-59; United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256, 264 (1946) (ownership
extends to “the space above the ground as he can occupy or use [it] in connection with the land”).
22
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(correct) assertion of overall social gains.24 The key point is to add a distributional
inquiry: does the redistribution of rights reduce the net worth to the individuals
who are subject to the new legal regime? With respect to air traffic and spectrum
use, the overall gains are so massive and so reciprocal, that it is hard to see how any
landowner who is denied either a holdout right or a cash compensation right is
worse off with those uses than without them. Other forms of property redefinition
cannot meet this distributional standard, and for them the case for cash
compensation is in general far stronger.
Thus far, the analysis of the spectrum shows that one technique for blocking
private gridlock is the judicious use of an eminent domain power, whose just
compensation requirement may be satisfied by the in‐kind benefits that are given to
landowners.25 However, even where a state taking is justified, there is still the
question of how to allocate the spectrum use among various players once that use is
freed of ground‐owner constraint. The common law private property solution is an
imitation of a first possession rule, which allows spectrum rights to be claimed by
the first user of that particular (fuzzy) band. There was some nascent movement
toward this bottom‐up system in the radio frequencies during the early 1920s,
including the well known Oak Leaves case that explicitly built on the common law
analogies.26 The virtues of this system cannot be easily dismissed; nor should they
be unduly romanticized. The key advantage of this system is that it allows for the
creation of a robust set of ownership rights that permit effective deployment and
use. The obvious problem is with user interference across signals, resulting in lower
transmission quality, to which there are several possible responses. The first is that
the frequencies can be effectively spaced, as each new entrant tries to create

24

See RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, SUPREME NEGLECT 58 (2008) (analyzing the relaxation of the ad
coelum rule).
25
The in-kind benefit comes in the form of restrictions on the property rights of others, providing
parallel and reciprocal benefits. See id. at 49-50.
26
Chicago Tribune Co. v. Oak Leaves Broad. Station (Ill. Cir. Ct. 1926,), reprinted in 68 CONG.
REC. 215-19 (1926) (recognizing rights in spectrum acquired by application of the resource to
productive use, essentially converting priority in time to priority of right, and drawing on water
rights models).
13

distance between him and his neighbor to minimize that risk.

The implicit

assumptions behind this model are, first, that the entry levels are gradual enough to
establish priority of entry—an assumption that fails when modern technology
allows for the instantaneous occupation and utilization of spaces and forces the use
of auctions to privatize the spectrum. The second assumption is limitation of the
amount of bandwidth that can be taken by each occupier and limitation of the
number of frequencies that each can take. The third is technological, namely the use
of more efficient transmission devices to pack more and more information into
narrower bands, which would reduce interference.
This early system for broadcast licenses did not last in part because of the
interference problem, which intensified during the rush to establish priority rights
and led to the passage of the 1927 Radio Act.27

The Act established the Federal

Radio Commission, which leveraged the physical interference problem into a
comprehensive system of government licenses to all players, even those who had
perfected their common law title under the first possession system. This maneuver
therefore removed private ownership as a means of allocation for the broadcast
spectrum, and led to the adoption of a complex administrative system based on
“public convenience, interest, or necessity.”28 This language was construed in grand
style, which led to this colossal miscalculation by Justice Felix Frankfurter, who
styled himself as the sophisticated opponent of naïve market solutions:
The Act itself establishes that the Commission's powers are not
limited to the engineering and technical aspects of regulation of radio
communication. Yet we are asked to regard the Commission as a kind
of traffic officer, policing the wave lengths to prevent stations from
interfering with each other. But the Act does not restrict the
Commission merely to supervision of the traffic. It puts upon the
Commission the burden of determining the composition of that traffic.
The facilities of radio are not large enough to accommodate all who
wish to use them. Methods must be devised for choosing from among
27

Radio Act of 1927, PUB L. NO. 69-632, 44 Stat. 1162 (repealed or merged 1934). For an
account of the events leading up to its passage, see Thomas W. Hazlett, Oak Leaves and the
Origins of the 1927 Radio Act, 95 PUB. CHOICE 277 (2004).
28
Radio Act, § 4, 44 Stat. 1163.
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the many who apply. And since Congress itself could not do this, it
committed the task to the Commission.
The Commission was, however, not left at large in performing
this duty. The touchstone provided by Congress was the "public
interest, convenience, or necessity," a criterion which "is as concrete
as the complicated factors for judgment in such a field of delegated
authority permit.”29
The many failures of the FCC in buckling down to the task that Justice
Frankfurter assigned it have been well documented.30 No one could have ever
expected this so‐called “touchstone” to provide serious guidance on frequency
allocation within the radio band.

The want of ownership rights, and the

consequence of inefficiency within the band, cannot be attributed to “too much
ownership.” They are attributable to the want of any private ownership system at
all. The problem is administrative overreaching, not overlapping and conflicting
property rights. Frankfurter’s notorious “touchstone” may be sufficient under
current administrative law to permit the delegation of legislative authority to
administrative agencies.31 Operationally, however, it is too vague to supply any
guidance for intelligent decision. Furthermore, the technical conditions attached to
license which dictate the kinds of equipment that the licensee has to deploy often
strip the allocated frequencies of much of their value. Indeed, one of the problems
in this portion of the spectrum is not gridlock, but localized underutilization borne
of direct regulation. A bandwidth for radio or television allocated 50 or 60 years
ago is now more than ample for its original purpose. A private owner would keep
some portion of the band, and license, lease or sell the remainder to some non‐
29

Nat’l Broad. Co. v. United States, 319 U.S. 190, 215-16 (1943) (quoting the Radio Act of 1927,
§ 4, 44 Stat. 1163, and Fed. Commc’n Comm'n v. Pottsville Broad. Co., 309 U.S. 134, 138
(1940), respectively).
30
See, e.g., R. H. Coase, The Federal Communications Commission, 2 J. L. & ECON. 1 (1959);
Thomas W. Hazlett, The Rationality of U.S. Regulation of the Broadcast Spectrum, 33 J. L. &
ECON. 133 (1990).
31
Such was the ultimate holding of the case, 319 U.S. at 225-26, though the language in question
was by then part of the Communications Act of 1934, PUB. L. NO. 73-416, 48 Stat 1064, into
which the surviving parts of the 1927 Act were merged. For a broad delegation, see, for example,
Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S. 414, 420 (1944) (upholding the Office of Price Administration‘s
power to “stabilize” prices and to prevent “speculative, unwarranted, and abnormal” price
increases).
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interfering use in order to squeeze more value out of the frequency. However, that
cannot happen when state licenses require the government to authorize multiple
uses, which governments will find it difficult to issue in any politically charged
environment.

The result is waste through government intervention, precisely

because there is no private property system to act as a counterweight.
The use of state power explains some of the implicit inefficiencies in the use
of the highly‐occupied spectrum, but it cannot explain the relative idleness of huge
portions of the spectrum today. Gridlock, however, offers no explanation either.
The key decisions were all made as early as 1912 when the United States
government made its initial spectrum allocation (free of all ground‐owner concerns)
by administrative fiat, with, at best, a partial appreciation of the future evolution of
the system.32 The Navy therefore came out very well because it was easy to see that
it would have extensive ship‐to‐shore and ship‐to‐ship uses.33 Similar allocations
were made to other forms of government use, including public health and safety,
which are, as Heller notes, both primitive and unreliable precisely because they are
government operated.34 These initial 1912 allocations proved wildly incorrect, and
became more anachronistic with each passing generation. 35 It is not that we have
gridlock among private property owners.

It is that we have nontransferable

government rights. The incomplete “propertization” of the spectrum has led to
public gridlock.
The same can be said of the FCC efforts to create areas of unlicensed
spectrum, where parties rely on self‐help devices to prevent the usual kind of
interference clutter between adjacent radio signals. There is an extensive technical
32

The Radio Act of 1912, 37 Stat. 302, required that broadcasters have licenses from the
Secretary of Commerce and Labor. The history can be found in THOMAS G. KRATTENMAKER &
LUCAS A. POWE, JR., REGULATING BROADCAST PROGRAMMING 5-12 (1994).
33
KRATTENMAKER & POWE, supra note XX, at 6-7.
34
HELLER, supra note XX, at 83.
35
Thomas Hazlett argues that, contrary to the “error theory” advanced to explain the failure of the
early allocations, the chosen regulatory approach was actually a self-interested move to maximize
rents for influential constituencies. Hazlett, supra note XX, at 134. There is nothing which says
that different factors had different weights at different times.
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dispute as to whether this system of unlicensed low frequencies allows for more
intensive utilization than the alternative system that allocates a portion of the
spectrum to a single owner who can then decide whether and, if so, which rights to
permit, perhaps at lower rates.36 Ultimately, if the unlicensed spectrum is inefficient
it is not so much because of gridlock. It is because of interference externalities that
could be eliminated by allowing single owners to regulate defined portions of the
spectrum at some positive price.
IV. The Government Creation of Gridlock: Labor Market Regulation
Heller’s third key mistake ignores the positive role that the government has
taken in creating gridlock in otherwise competitive markets. Competitive markets
work well not because they are instantly and always in perfect equilibrium. Rather
they do so because of the activities of transactors on each side of a market,
examining the choices open to them on the other side. It is easy therefore to defend
a legal regime that seeks to prevent the combination of parties on either side of the
market that would reduce the available choices on the other. This notion is clearly
expressed in the antitrust law which regards horizontal efforts to fix prices or to
divide territories as per se violations of the law, given their adverse social
consequences.37 Alternatively, a single monopolist may raise the price of goods (or
services) above the competitive level, which in turn will reduce the total level of
social welfare, by blocking transactions for mutual gain that would be completed in
a competitive market somewhere between the competitive and the (higher)
monopoly price.

36

See, e.g., Yochai Benkler, Some Economics of Wireless Communications, 16 HARV. J. L &
TECH. 125 (2002) (critiquing a property rights approach and suggesting open networks to
optimize capacity). For a comprehensive account of the spectrum management choices, see
Philip J. Weiser & Dale N. Hatfield, Policing the Spectrum Commons, 74 FORDHAM. L. REV. 663
(2004).
37
United States v. Topco Assoc., Inc., 405 U.S. 596 (1972) (finding horizontal allocation of
territories per se illegal); United States v. Trenton Potteries Co., 273 U.S. 392 (1927) (finding
horizontal price-fixing agreements to be, in themselves, unreasonable restraints on trade and
therefore illegal).
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This stylized account of the antitrust law is not concerned with gridlock
issues. The single monopolist has every interest to reduce transaction costs in order
to maximize his gains. The only modest source of difficulty for the monopolist is the
choice between a single‐price or multiple‐part pricing schedule (where the quality
of goods remains constant) in order to reach both high‐ and low‐demanders
simultaneously.38 This difficulty, however, is not qualitatively greater than similar
pricing issues that can arise in competitive markets. One such problem arises
whenever differential costs of providing service require differential pricing in order
to prevent the cross‐subsidies that can drive some desirable customers from the
market. And a second arises whenever a seller has to allocate joint costs across its
multiple product lines.39
The risks of gridlock are vastly increased by the formation of bilateral
monopolies that raise transactional difficulties not found in heavily cartelized
markets. One of the great “achievements” from the New Deal on forward has been
our unerring ability to convert efficient competitive markets into inefficient
regulated markets, where the gridlock issues—here measured by the cost of
negotiations, plus the risk of strikes and other breakdowns—became paramount.
We can thus identify an important class of cases of government‐sponsored gridlock.
These pro‐gridlock policies stand in instructive contrast to the common law
preference for at‐will type contracts, whereby a worker could be fired for good
reason, bad reason, or no reason at all.40 Dismissal could be accompanied by a
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For example, consider the movie theater ticket pricing strategy to charge less for seniors and
students in order to capture these price-sensitive segments of the market without sacrificing the
high prices charged for general admission.
39
Michael E. Levine, Price Discrimination without Market Power, 19 Yale J. on Reg. 1 (2002)
(demonstrating how shared costs can bring about price discrimination even from firms without
market power).
40
For my defense, see Richard A. Epstein, In Defense of the Contract at Will, 51 U. CHI. L. REV.
947 (1984). For the common law example, see Payne v. Western & Atl. R.R., 81 Tenn. 507, 51819 (1884) (“[M]en must be left, without interference to buy and sell where they please, and to
discharge or retain employe[e]s at will for good cause or for no cause, or even for bad cause
without thereby being guilty of an unlawful act per se. It is a right which an employe[e] may
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severance package, computed by a simple formula. And it was paired with the
right—still respected today—of the employee to quit for good reason, bad reason or
no reason at all.41 The rule was only a default provision, subject to contractual
adjustments on such matters as severance pay, which were often designed to
prevent strategic quitting that could disrupt firm production. Indeed one of the
soundest (and most reviled) decisions of common law courts was to allow an
employer to bring an action against a union for inducing breach of the yellow dog
contract whereby the worker agreed not to join a union so long as he or she
remained on the job.42 The point here was to use tort principles to back up
contractual arrangements. Suits against individual workers who quit are likely to
prove a transactional nightmare, although they were not unknown.43 Yet the great
advantage of using the tort action of inducement of breach of contract against the
union was that it could enjoin activities to recruit workers into hidden membership
(a breach of contract) before the strike occurred, nipping the gridlock problem in
advance. This tort action offered a powerful method whereby employers could
preserve the operation of a competitive market—which is why it was targeted for
extinction first in England under the Trade Disputes Act of 1906,44 and then a
generation later in the United States through the Norris‐LaGuardia Act of 1932.45
Both statutes gutted a private tort action that hampered gridlock in the form of
strikes.

exercise in the same way, to the same extent, for the same cause or want of cause as the
employer.”), overruled on other grounds, Hutton v. Waters, 179 S.W. 134, 138 (Tenn. 1915).
41
Epstein, supra note XX, at 954, 973-74.
42
See Hitchman Coal & Coke Co. v. Mitchell, 245 U.S. 229 (1917) (“The right of action for
persuading an employee to leave his employer is universally recognized . . . .”).
43
See, e.g., Loewe v. Lawlor, 208 U.S. 274 (1908) (upholding suit against a labor union which
had, among other things, organized mass withdrawal).
44
6 Edw. VII c. 47 (1906). For criticism, see Charles K. Rowley, Toward a Political Economy of
British Labor Law, 51 U. CHI. L. REV. 1135, 1138, 1142-43 (1984) (discussing the conditions
created by the 1906 Act which led to rent-seeking and broad immunities for unions).
45
PUB. L. NO. 72-65, 47 Stat. 70 (codified at 29 U.S.C. §§ 101-10, 114-15). For the influential
book that spurred its adoption, see FELIX FRANKFURTER & NATHAN GREENE, THE LABOR
INJUNCTION (1930). For my defense of the yellow-dog contract, see Richard A. Epstein, A
Common Law for Labor Relations: A Critique of the New Deal Legislation, 92 YALE L.J. 1357,
1370-75, 1382-85 (1983).
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In the United States, Norris‐LaGuardia was only the first step to greater
gridlock. The National Labor Relations Act of 193546 took the issue to the next level,
by explicitly displacing competitive labor markets with a bilateral monopoly prone
to gridlock. The NLRA imposes elaborate duties on both sides to negotiate in good
faith with each other.47 It therefore makes the refusal to negotiate an unfair labor
practice.48 It further prevents individual workers from bargaining on their own
account, so that all negotiations go through the union.49 The only exit right left to
the firm is bargain to impasse. The stakes for these negotiations are always high;
the risk of strike remains large. Once the system is put into place, the employer is
stripped of the ability to make unilateral changes in labor contracts in response to
major changes in conditions. The systematic decline in the automobile, steel, tire,
and other industries can be attributed to this built‐in rigidity, which means that all
downward reduction in wages, benefits, and conditions of employment come too
little too late.50 Despite this experience, the legislative impulse today is not to
eliminate senseless friction by scrapping this gridlock‐prone system. Rather, it is to
move in the opposite direction. Thus the misnamed Employee Free Choice Act,51
which thus far has not become law, seeks to stop gridlock by forcing binding
arbitration on an employer once the parties have bargaining to impasse with the aid
of a mediator. At that point, a government arbitration panel appointed by the
Department of Labor can impose mandatory two year “contracts” by fiat.52 These
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PUB. L. NO. 74-198, 49 Stat. 449 (1935), as amended, 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169 (2006).
§ 158(d). For example, where a collective-bargaining contract is already in place, the laws
imposes complex notification requirements to various agencies and services with potentially very
burdensome waiting periods. See id.
48
§ 158(a)(5).
49
§ 159(a) (designated representatives “shall be the exclusive representatives of all the employees
in such unit for the purposes of collective bargaining in respect to rates of pay, wages, hours of
employment, or other conditions of employment”).
50
See Epstein, supra note XX, at 1402.
51
Employee Free Choice Act (EFCA), S. 560, H.R. 1409, 111th Cong. (2009).
52
See Sec. 3(h)(3) (modifying Sec. 8 of the National Labor Relations Act, at 29 U.S.C. 158),
which reads:
(3) If after the expiration of the 30-day period beginning on the date on which the
request for mediation is made under paragraph (2), or such additional period as the
parties may agree upon, the Service is not able to bring the parties to agreement by
conciliation, the Service shall refer the dispute to an arbitration board established in
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contracts cover every aspect of the terms and conditions of traditional labor
contracts—wages, work conditions, pensions, benefits, discipline and the like.
Ironically, Heller says not a single word about these legislative tendencies to abolish
private property rights in ways that aggravate the gridlock economy that he rightly
deplores.
V. Government Gridlock: Land Use Regulation
The creation of government gridlock also extends to real estate markets,
which are always more difficult to operate than labor markets because of the
obvious external effects that occur in land use, both in urban and rural
environments. The current system of land use regulation is prone to conspicuous
instances of gridlock that surface at every zoning hearing across the United States.
The all‐pervasive nature of the permit and regulation problem in land use markets
shows that this problem is not one of those unobserved gridlock difficulties to which
Heller refers from time to time.53 The huge public tumults over zoning hearings give
ample evidence of the paralysis that can descend upon the operation of real estate
markets. The current situation is that the government cannot occupy property or
initiate any project unless it is prepared to condemn the land.54 But, under current
law, its multiple agencies exercise a virtual per se veto power over every
development that does not meet its exacting and often inconsistent standards. This
problem is compounded because the multiple veto points found in zoning
accordance with such regulations as may be prescribed by the Service. The arbitration
panel shall render a decision settling the dispute and such decision shall be binding upon
the parties for a period of 2 years, unless amended during such period by written consent
of the parties.'.
I have inveighed against this system in Richard A. Epstein, THE CASE AGAINST THE
EMPLOYEE
FREE
CHOICE
ACT
50-68
(2009),
available
at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1337185. I also criticize the provisions
aimed to reduce employer resistance during organization drives, and, more importantly, with the
proposed card-check voting arrangement that did away with secret ballots in selecting union
leaders. Id. at 18-49.
53
See, e.g. HELLER, supra note __, at 2, 67, 187.
54
See, e.g. Loretto v. TelePrompter Manhattan CATV, 458 U.S. 419 (1982) (per se liability for
physical takings only).
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regulations often complicate the task of keeping a project alive, as various agencies,
often backed by an indignant public opinion or community board, chip away at its
economic viability. It need not be this way; the potential solution is a sensible
system of regulation that operates on very different premises. This becomes
apparent by comparing the current gridlock apparatus to the earlier common law
rules that served to eliminate these costly and corrosive bottlenecks.
Common Law Rules. Any system of land use regulation is necessarily more
difficult than the optimal form of regulation for labor markets. In labor markets, the
physical externality issues are unimportant; what matters is whether the markets
are organized in a competitive or regulated form. Not so with land use. To be sure,
everyone agrees that, short of condemnation, landowners enjoy the exclusive rights
of use and development for their property.55 But on no account do they enjoy the
unlimited rights of use and development of their property, given the twin torts of
trespass to land and nuisance.56

For example, it is of course clear, and

nonproblematic, that the ownership of one parcel of land does not allow for the
encroachment upon land owned by another.57 But the harder cases all involve
situations in which the harms involved do not come from actual, physical entry or
encroachment, but through invasion by smells, soot, vibration, odors, and the like.
Every system of property rights of which I am aware brands these, nontrespassory
invasions as nuisances, rather than as trespass.58 The logic for this is clear enough.
As a first approximation, it is better if no one engages in nuisance‐like activities of
these types than if everyone does. The value of two neighboring parcels of land, on
average, will both increase if each owner obeys general nuisance prescriptions.
55

See, e.g., Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164 (1979)(holding compensable partial
intrusions on exclusive rights).
56
See, e.g. Northwestern Fertilizing Co. v. Hyde Park, 97 U.S. 659 (1878)(police power extends
to nuisance abatement and control).
57
See, e.g., Garagosian v. Union Realty Co., 193 N.E. 726 (Mass. 1935) (ordering removal of
encroachments); Pile v. Pedrick, 31 A. 646 (Pa. 1895) (ordering removal of underground
encroachments).
58
See, e.g., Morgan v. High Penn Oil Co., 77 S.E.2d 682, 689-90 (N.C. 1953) (“[A]ny substantial
nontrespassory invasion of another’s interest in the private use and enjoyment of land by any type
of liability forming conduct is a private nuisance.” In this instance, the liability forming conduct
was that the defendant oil refinery emitted “noxious gases and odors” in great quantities.)
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Therefore, no one wants to move back to a world in which the baseline entitlement
of exclusive use confers unlimited rights of use.
Yet the physical invasion requirement has a clear negative correlative that is
consistent with the effort to use tort law to maximize the value of two (or more)
adjacent plots of land: various kinds of admitted private harms are not actionable
within the system. Modern economic theory calls these “pecuniary externalities.”59
The classical law called them instances of damnum absque injuria—harm without
legal injury. The root conception of both is that, for harms in these classes, there is
no longer the positive association between the private right of action and overall
social welfare. Rather, the correlation now runs in the opposite direction in that the
private harm complained of, on average, is indicative of an improvement in overall
social welfare.
These nonactionable harms include, most notably, four kinds of losses. The
first is the blocking of views, which usually can only be prevented by stopping all
forms of construction. As a joint matter, both sides are better off in the ex ante
position if both can build, rather than neither. To let the first one to build gain
protections against like construction by others creates a perverse incentive for the
premature development of land. The legal rule that tells the landowner that it may
act today or tomorrow as it pleases, without loss or compromise of rights,
eliminates the need to play such games.
The second kind of nonactionable harms under nuisance law are harms that
stem from a lack of access to another landowner’s property. Thus it is not an
actionable nuisance to fill in wetlands, even if it denies access to the fish or wildlife
that previously have used it.60 Nor is it a nuisance to destroy the habitat that is
desired by some endangered species, although the modern case law moves in that
59

Wikipedia.org, Pecuniary Externality, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pecuniary_externality (last
visited Sept. 9, 2009).
60
See, e.g., K & K Constr. v. Dep’t of Natural Res., 551 N.W.2d 413, 64 (Mich. Ct. App. 1996)
(“The decision to build a restaurant on land, or a request to fill in wetlands, does not constitute a
nuisance that the government may abate.”)
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direction.61 The point here is not that these uses are not valuable, but rather it is
that they are not well‐regulated by coercion when the likely response of a
landowner is to destroy or impair a habitat lest it become a liability for his own use.
The argument in this context is that while it is not permissible to have one’s cattle
graze on the land of another, it is permissible to allow the state to force owners to
permit unowned cattle (or birds) to use one’s land, even if it causes harm to the
owner’s farm animals or structures. It is, on this view, a nuisance for a landowner to
exclude wild animals that want to graze on his land (under traditional views, this
grazing would be actionable as a routine case of cattle trespass). The government
thus forces entry but disclaims liability by renouncing ownership of the harm‐
causing animals, disincentivizing landowners from maintaining such purposes. The
better strategy, by far, is to allow the state to condemn property for habitat
protection, or to allow the owner to enter into voluntary arrangements with
environmental groups to preserve the habitat (such as agreements with oil
companies that they will take more care in drilling for oil in exchange for paying a
smaller royalty). Since there are many outsiders who can try to claim some unique
interest in someone else’s land, impositions by the public must be constrained or it
can end up freezing development in typical gridlock fashion.
The third example of a nonactionable harm in the land use context is
identical to one found in labor markets: indeed many cases involve an amalgam of
the two. Competitive harms from new entry—a store moving in next door—are
nonactionable, no matter how great the financial losses to the incumbent. The
reason for this rule is that any complete social accounting cannot limit itself to
reckoning only the gains and losses between the two neighboring parties; it must
also look to the position of third persons whom the transaction impacts. The
ordinary nuisance that diminishes the effective use and value of all land reduces the
opportunities of thirds persons to buy and lease into the system. The introduction
of new competitors into the marketplace has positive effects, by expanding
61

See, Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of Communities for Great Oregon, 515 U.S. 687
(1995)(treating habitat destruction as “harm” under the Endangered Species Act).
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consumer choices. So, the negative correlation between private harm and social
gain justifies calling those competitive harms nonactionable—in a conscious and
correct refinement of John Stuart Mill’s harm principle, which is otherwise
necessarily overbroad.62
The fourth set of nonactionable harms includes those in the form of personal
offense taken at what others say or do. Basic First Amendment law takes the
position that the mere aversion that one has to the views of another individual or
his expressive practices, no matter how intense, offers no justification for stopping
that individual from speaking or acting as he pleases.63 The most dramatic examples
of this principle are vituperative speech and flag burning (so long as the
complainant does not own the flag).64 Here again, we are in general better off with
both kinds of speech than with neither, and are careful to make sure that people
cannot gain rights to control the actions of others by taking undue umbrage at them.
Once again, some emendation of the Millian principle of harm is needed to slow
down the train of government regulation. It follows from this principle of offense,
therefore, that there is no actionable nuisance for reductions in property value
because—fill in the name of your least favorite group of people—has moved into the
neighborhood.
This initial step to limit the class of actionable wrongs set of harm‐defining
maneuvers is key because it limits the scope of nasty personal interactions that can
trigger judicial intervention. If this common law approach to nuisance is right on
normative grounds, it should also set the stage for getting the correct analysis of the
legislative system.

It follows therefore that if we adopt this theory, judicial

intervention is left for those cases of highest social return. Other objectives, such as
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For my discussion of the uses and limits of this principle, see Richard A. Epstein, The Harm
Principle—And How it Grew, 45 U. TORONTO L.J. 369 (1995).
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See Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 414 (1989) (“If there is a bedrock principle underlying the
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because society finds the idea itself offensive or disagreeable.”)
64
See Spence v. Washington, 418 U.S. 405 (1974) (defacing the American flag in political protest
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habitat protection and landmark preservation can be realized either through
condemnation or contract, most commonly through covenants that run with the
land, binding and benefiting both sides. Once therefore the definition of nuisances
narrows, the scope for potential remedial action necessarily shrinks as well. At this
point, the central issue becomes the type and timing of the remedies for the class of
wrongful invasions so defined. In this regard, we have to take due notice that the
land is often both permanent and fixed, so that even if one person can sell or lease,
his successor in title will have to face the same problems. It is painfully easy to see
how the operation of a factory that pollutes one area today can continue to pollute
that same area tomorrow. Hence injunctions, as well as damages (always difficult to
estimate permanent interests in land) have always been available, at least for those
nuisances above a certain low‐threshold,65 where the risks of hold‐out are generally
regarded as material.
Timing is, however, equally critical to the type of remedy available. The
usual common law approach postponed the use of injunctive relief until the
expected hazard was both imminent and serious, under the standard equitable tests
that stressed “irreparable harm.”66 It was considered better to wait, so long as the
damage remedy remained available for any harms that did occur (these remedies
already gave land users and developers one strong incentive to steer clear of
trouble). Waiting to seek an injunction reduces the administrative costs of the
system by allowing most cases to sort themselves out long before any kind of
serious harm occurs. But once the harm becomes imminent, no mercy for the
defendant becomes the appropriate response—one which has the added benefit of
encouraging defendants to steer clear of the line, or to procure the consent of
neighbors for potential injuries before undertaking a project. Thus, the bottom line
is that these rules produce very few, if any, cases of gridlock. The definition of
65

These low-level common nuisances are rendered per se legal under the so-called “live and let
live” rule on the grounds that the initial presumption is reversed. Both parties are better off
suffering some small nuisance in exchange for an increased freedom of action. See Bamford v.
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For a general discussion, see Robert Ellickson Alternatives to Zoning: Covenants, Nuisance
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nuisance excludes the three most common types of harm—blocking views,
competition, and offense— and uses few, strong, and late remedies to deter those
nuisances that remain actionable under the law.
There is, of course, one serious gap in this model that in some instances
requires public intervention. Nuisances come in all shapes and sizes. The private
law system works best when one neighbor pollutes or threatens to pollute his
neighbor. But the system does not work as well when it is unclear which neighbor
will be harmed if a nuisance occurs. It is costly for private parties to band together,
and it is unlikely that one neighbor will sue for the benefit of all.

In these

circumstances, the use of public power to enjoin activities is an effective way to
overcome this transactional barrier. But there is one huge caveat that defines this
shift from private to public enforcement: the identity of the plaintiff may change, but
the principles under which either damages or injunctions are issued do not. The
sole reason for the shift is transaction cost reduction, not to give the state expanded
powers that upset the efficient distribution of remedies that were created under this
common law regime.
Modern Administration. The modern system of land use regulation has
disregarded the above assumption. Instead, it assumes that once the state gets
involved in the case, neither the narrow definition of harm, nor the restricted use of
injunctions to cases of imminent harm, matters. Each and every one of the four
types of harms excluded from the private law of nuisance thus becomes the proper
object of permissible public regulation that routinely considers such matters as
aesthetics, growth, affordable housing, wetlands protection, endangered species and
the like. This hugely expanded definition of harm guarantees that the number of
actionable interactions between people will increase, which in turn will put greater
pressure on the remedial side of the system.

And when the remedies are

considered, the requirement of imminent harm disappears in favor of some kind of
precautionary principle, whereby the activity in question has to be regarded as
wholly safe before anything can be undertaken.
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The current system thus starts with the proposition that blocking views,
preserving habitat, engaging in economic competition, or engaging in activities that
cause offense locally are now all legitimate concerns for regulation for which no
compensation is required to the affected landowner. The National Environmental
Policy Act,67 which deals with information collection on a range of topics that
includes how “to assure all Americans safe, healthful, productive, and aesthetically
and culturally pleasing surroundings” or to “attain the widest range of beneficial
uses of the environmental without degradation, risk to health or safety, or other
undesirable or unintended consequences.” The clear subtext is that over which you
can collect information you can regulate.

68

Any new structure that is built within

any community will therefore be likely to have profound effects on large numbers of
nearby persons. The permit process is so cumbersome and time‐consuming that it
could not possibly be run through the judicial system.

So by default, an

administrative approach has to take over regulation, which makes land use
regulation fertile ground for a system of multiple vetoes that defines the gridlock
economy. Typically, this process will be dominated politically by well‐connected
persons (often with private agendas) who live in the neighborhood that is cheek by
jowl with the new development. At this point, the aggregation of preferences is a
nightmare because some of the neighbors will get economic, social, or aesthetic
gains from the operation, and hence will favor it, while many others will be opposed.
If the matter ceases to be an up or down vote on the new project, virtually everyone
will have some idea on how to tinker with the enterprise in order to expand their
scope of influence. The local bias will exert its influence on the timing question.
With harms so numerous, the imminence test yields to the precautionary principle,
whether we deal with zoning or environmental protection. Indeed all these issues
can easily mix together. One sense of the broad definition of externality is found in
Chinese Staff & Workers Association v. City of New York,69 where the question was
whether the construction of a new luxury condominium could so alter the ratio of
67
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Chinese to Italians on the edges of Chinatown, as to trigger an immediate
environmental survey that at the very least would slow down the redevelopment
project for reasons that having nothing to do with either common law nuisances or
the social provision of infrastructure.70 The New York Court of Appeal, under its
SEPA (the state analogue to NEPA found that this construction had sufficient an
adverse effect on the “physical environment”–defined to cover historical and
aesthetic changes as well as population shifts within the community–to trigger a
full‐scale environmental impact statement. The plaintiffs: Chinese groups (which
had themselves moved into what was once Little Italy) that feared their
displacement owing to new competitive entry. The decision was a perfect invitation
to gridlock that necessarily slighted any gains from the new project that would inure
to the new owners, their employees, and customers. The point here is not to
lengthened the list of relevant considerations beyond those provided by statute. It
is to narrow the list to defeat the unwise territorialism of deliberative processes,
which silences all outsiders to ‘the’ community.
The actual response cuts in the opposite direction. Given the large set of
relevant interests, no one thinks that litigation offers an initial response. So instead
a blizzard of statutes fronts load the permit process under a full participation model
of democratic politics that gives every outsider has his or her say. The public
officials or boards then have veto power over the project, often in layers. The New
York City Uniform Land Use Review Process (ULURP), for example, requires, after
an initial certification, a Community Board Review, a Borough President Review, a
City Planning Commission Review, a City Council Review, and a Mayoral Review.71
So the new standard requires that you prove that you won’t step on any of the broad
interests that are relevant in these cases before you are allowed to undertake the
new project. The permitting process becomes, by far, the single most important
feature of land development. Most new projects must go through multiple layers of
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permit approval before construction can even begin, including dredge and fill
permits that are within the province of the Army Corp of Engineers. And where the
federal government leaves off, state departments of natural resources can pick up
the slack. Gridlock personified.
Once we have objected, moreover, to the common law approach because of
external effects, nothing says that the community harms cannot also arise from the
inside of a real estate project, which has, of course, no nuisance‐like characteristics.
It is therefore common today that we have all sorts of other strictures on new
construction that become veto or choke points for the process. The amount of
affordable (below market) housing that must be built is now subject to extensive
multilateral negotiations, which must be concluded before construction can begin.
No one thinks that a higher supply will result in more units at lower prices.
Access for the disabled, especially those in wheelchairs, becomes another example
of a legitimate state interest, such that any project can be slowed down or stopped if
it does not meet stringent requirements, whether or not someone disabled lives
there.72 Labor relations also matter. Since market solutions were already rejected
in labor cases, it is now fair game to slow down a permit process if organized labor
does not get guaranteed work on the project, for example. And of course there is no
particular reason not to also impose various other exactions on local developers, not
just to handle the increased traffic that they bring into the neighborhood, but also to
subsidize the construction of improvements that benefit existing residents. And
from this plethora of permits comes no judicial relief. Speak to various large scale
developers and they will speak as one. There is no legal protection. Everything
requires a political solution. It is gridlock squared.
The dynamics of this process have one key feature, the systematic separation
of power from responsibility. There is no effective remedy against an administrator
who says that he needs to see more documents or to review the documents that he
72

See ADA Accessibility Guidelines for Buildings and Facilities § 4.1, available at
http://www.access-board.gov/adaag/html/adaag.htm#4.1 (last visited Sept. 11, 2009).
30

already has in possession. Nor is there any principle of res judicata that guarantees
that the approval that is given one day will stick the next. The basic rules do not
treat permits as vested until final approval is obtained, no matter how extensive the
predevelopment costs undertaken in reliance on administrative understandings.
Litigation, moreover, is not appropriate until the administrative process has been
exhausted,73 which allows officials to string along everything even further. It does
not take much imagination to see how costs spiral, which in turn brings in fresh calls
for additional subsidies and penalties, which overheat the market still further.
Different kinds of permits, moreover, are administered by different kinds of groups
with different sorts or expertise so that any change in one dimension could require a
redrawing of plans that has to run through the entire cycle yet a second time.
Gridlock necessarily follows in a permit culture, not from having too many private
property rights, but from having too many systems of oversight in search of too
many objectives, which leaves too much unfettered discretion in the hands of public
officials who do not have to bear the costs of their own arrogance or mistakes.
The question then arises as to what tactics could be used to overcome this
problem in the current legal environment. One possibility for overcoming gridlock
is to engage in condemnation of properties that are needed to create some larger
assembly of land. This approach appeals to Heller,74 who is keenly aware of how a
single landowner with a strategically held tract can block an entire process.75 But
the eminent domain process is in fact highly complex. On the one hand, Heller is far
too sanguine about the operation of the power. He thus defends the Supreme
Court’s decision in Kelo v. City of New London,76 which had generated a firestorm of
public protest when private land was taken for the purposes of economic
development under a very broad reading of the “public use” language in the takings
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clause, giving the local government complete discretion on what land to take.77
Heller’s argument would make some sense if there were some sort of land assembly
process that the Kelo plaintiffs had blocked.

But, in fact, this was a classic

illustration of eminent domain abuse because the City of New London had no idea
what it was to do with the land (which four years later still lays vacant), and at no
time needed it in order to complete any of the projects that it had on tap. To say
that “the underlying facts may seem troubling”78 understates the point a thousand
fold, given that the Supreme Court could have affirmed the ability of the state to take
private lands in order to overcome assembly problems without giving it carte
blanche to roust individuals from their homes in order to get snazzier buildings in
their place. And the situation does not get any better because the compensation
provided in these cases always leaves the landowner worse off than before by
denying compensation for any of the collateral costs associated with eminent
domain, such as litigation costs, appraisal costs, and moving costs. The eminent
domain solution is thus capable of real abuse that leads to excessive condemnations
for no good social reasons.
There are, of course, many situations in which eminent domain powers are
available but cannot be used effectively. And here we see the gridlock problem in
yet another guise.

On this point, Heller offers one proposed solution that is

misplaced. In the first instance, he argues that the way in which to cope with the
various approval processes is through the creation of a system of land assembly
districts (LADs) which he claims will “fix gridlock by giving neighbors a say in
whether their land is assembled for economic development,”79 particularly in
blighted areas.80 The point here is to allow “the neighbors” to decide what land
assembly projects belong in “their community.” But the program only adds an
additional layer of confusion to all that precedes it. Many of the most bitter land use
77
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disputes take place where the developer has put together land for a new project by
voluntary means alone. Yet it should not be thought that “the community” will have
no say in whether that project is completed. Unfortunately, when it does have its
say, it often responds to powerful pressures to say that a development that is
needed citywide should be completed, just “not in my backyard” (NIMBY).
The NIMBY movement gets off to the wrong start when it claims ownership
interests in property—“my backyard”—that is owned by others.

Just deciding

where the district lines should be drawn will create major disputes, as there are
sure to be some projects that are located at the edge of one district whose impacts
will be felt by individuals next door. Any land assembly districts will just add
another layer of gridlock to the cumbrous processes that are already in place. Quite
simply, there is no way to fix the gridlock problem unless we narrow the definition
of externality to exclude all of the various ills that now count as protectable harm.
Once that definition is narrowed, the eminent domain process can kick in. Those
people who wish to require a builder to redesign his structure for what they
conceive of as aesthetic reasons may do so as long as they pay the freight. But it is
amazing how few soft externalities people care to correct when forced to tax their
community for the result.
In addition, Heller does not fully understand why the eminent domain
process does not work in those cases for which it is needed. For example, no one
disputes that airports and runways often require the use of the eminent domain
power for land assembly. Nor does anyone question that taking land for airports is
taking land for public use. For many years the construction of airports did not
generate huge controversy, even when master builders like Robert Moses81 were
known to trample small people under foot.82 Yet, while Heller reports that since the
deregulation of air traffic in 1975, the volume of traffic has tripled, only one new
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airport has been built, in Denver.83 The explanation, however, is not gridlock from
private ownership, which is counteracted by the capacity to condemn land on
payment of just compensation. Indeed many jurisdictions have “quick take” statutes
that allow the property to be paid for before the total amount of compensation is
determined, which in some instances is lowballed.84 Rather, it comes through the
operation of the extensive permit system that gives all sorts of persons, including
nonowners of the condemned property, an opportunity to challenge the location
and size of the airport. Those powers exist even if the designated land is already
located in public hands. In some instances, the objections, which relate to nuisances,
such as noise and traffic, may be well conceived. But in other cases, the protests are
done because of all sorts of collateral motivations. It is thus hard, in these cases, to
defend the proposition that huge public projects should be whisked through the
political and administrative process without a close look. But, no matter how the
trade‐offs between speed and legitimacy are done, one thing is clear: gridlock from
private ownership is just not part of this knotty problem.
V. The Patent Thicket
The last of the gridlock situations that calls for some examination is the
structure of ownership rights under patent law. The claims for the creation of an
anticommons lie in the assertion that useful pieces of information, particularly
about drugs and drug research, are parceled out among so many rights‐holders that
it is impossible for the diligent researchers to assemble the needed tools and
chemicals for further investigation via voluntary cooperation. As in general, there
are two ways to test this claim. The first is to ask whether there are any other
explanations for the decline in new drug innovation. The second is to ask whether,
83
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even if those are put aside, there is reason to believe that the anticommons
argument makes a key difference in this area. I take these up in order.
As with his studies of gridlock generally, Heller overlooks the many other
forces that operate in given fields. Here is not the place to discuss the many woes of
the pharmaceutical industry, but it is important to note that every major policy shift
in the pharmaceutical area in the last decade has reduced the returns to
pharmaceutical investment. I shall just tick them off. First, the pricing end of the
business is under stress.

Many foreign nations pursue aggressive monopsony

buying policies that reduce returns.

The various government purchase plans

through Medicaid have similar effects in this country, with more to come under any
health reform package that is likely to make its way through Congress. These
activities can be expected to reduce the return to drug companies and with it the
return for drug innovation.85 In addition, the costs and complexity of clinical trials
have vastly increased, eroding the protection otherwise available under the Hatch‐
Waxman Act.86 The cost of bringing new drugs to market includes both the time
value of money and the cost of compounds that fail to make the cut. A full cost

85

Benjamin Zycher, The Human Cost of Federal Price Negotiations: The Medicare Prescription
Drug Benefit and Pharmaceutical Innovation (Manhattan Institute, Center for Medical Progress,
2006, available at
https://www.policyarchive.org/bitstream/handle/10207/11618/mpr_03.pdf?sequence=1
(last visited Sept. 11, 2009).
86
Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984 (Hatch-Waxman Act), Pub.
L. No. 98-417, 98 Stat. 1585 (1984). “[U]nder the 1984 Hatch Waxman Act, Congress granted
patent holders limited extensions of their patent period as a partial offset to the time lost before
the FDA . . . With ever longer periods in clinical trials, this period does not come close to
allowing effective patent use for the full patent term.” EPSTEIN, SUPREME NEGLECT, supra note
__, at 160.
35

estimate from 2003 places that figure at around $1.3 billion per drug87—a value
which has to be recouped during the ten or so years of effective patent life.88
Exposure to liability has also increased with the recent amendments to the
Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (FDCA)89 and their judicial interpretation,
leaving warnings, however thorough, exposed to the risk of being upended by state
tort actions.90 Any evaluation of overall levels of drug initiatives has to take into
account these forces, which cut unambiguously against pharmaceutical innovation.
Yet suppose we now put aside these issues to concentrate solely on the
gridlock problem as it pertains to pharmaceutical innovation. As mentioned above,
the original version of this claim was made by Heller and Rebecca Eisenberg in their
1998 Science article, which featured their theoretical claim that the anticommons
had thwarted innovation.91 Their article, however, could be challenged on both
empirical and theoretical grounds.
Start with the empirical. Heller and Eisenberg did not offer any empirical
evidence of either the nature or extent of the anticommons problem. In Gridlock,
Heller reports his conversations with an anonymous head of a “Big Pharma” drug
maker who told him “that his lab scientists developed the potential cure (call it
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Compound X) [for Alzheimer’s] years ago, but biotech competitors blocked its
development.”92
Oh? This statement leaves more questions opens than it answers.
First, any (anonymous) claim for a potential cure for Alzheimer’s has to be
greeted with a grain of salt. That disease is doubtless a composite condition as
complex to understand as cancer, for which there is no still no magic bullet.
Compound X may have helped manage some portion of the disease, but hardly all of
it. Nor does any statement about one firm address the question of whether other
pharmaceutical companies have continued to pursue research in this area.93 Owing
to the huge amount of research in this area, it is hard to think that future success or
failure were tied to a single compound among many. The prospect of financial gain
has surely lured others into the field.
Second, Heller offers no explanation as to how biotech competitors could
exert this power under the current law. By definition, the competitors are pursuing
alternative approaches to the disease. But what this company needed were the
complementary technologies and compounds that are not controlled by
competitors. Nor is it clear that, for each stage in the process, there is one and only
one compound or tool that will do the trick. There would be no holdout problem for
research components that were competitively supplied.
Third, Heller offers an incomplete analysis of the empirical literature, much
of which cuts in the opposite direction. In one study published in Science, John
Walsh, Ashish Arora, and Wesley Cohen94 surveyed 70 attorneys, scientists, and
managers who were active in the pharmaceutical and biotech industries. Their
92
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research goal was to assemble evidence that indicated the magnitude of the
anticommons problem in biotechnology.

The findings, however, revealed that

almost none of the recipients claimed that the current legal patent regime posed
serious obstacles to their research. In both industry and university labs, researchers
adopted strategies of “licensing, inventing around patents, going offshore, the
development and use of public databases and research tools, court challenges, and
simply using the technology without a license (i.e. infringement)” to achieve their
particular goals.95 A few years later, the verdict was unchanged, as Walsh and his
colleagues reported empirical results that demonstrated that “access to patents on
knowledge inputs rarely imposes a significant burden on academic biomedical
research.”96 In reaching this conclusion, Walsh observed, as Heller reports, “that 29
percent of recently executed material transfer agreements had reach‐through
claims, 16 percent provided for royalties, and 26 percent imposed publication
restrictions. In areas with intense commercial interest, 30 percent of researchers
surveyed did not receive the last biological research materials they requested.”97
Heller takes a less sanguine view of these results than did the authors of the
study. He wonders whether it makes sense to move research off‐shore to avoid
patent claims.98 My own reaction is that it hardly matters provided the ultimate
commercial products be brought back. Indeed, in terms of current domestic policy I
am more worried about research projects and clinics that relocate elsewhere to
escape the very exacting standards that United States regulators impose on animal
care and clinical studies.

Unlike Heller, I am not particularly concerned that

American patent law does not allow any special research exemption for using
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patented products.99 There are perfectly good explanations as to why that practice
is likely to continue in the future. Typically, medical researchers are not in direct
competition with the patent holder insofar as they do not attempt to sell the
patented technology or product on the market. Instead, their research has positive
spillover effects for the patent holder. If it reveals good information, it allows the
patentee to extend sales to new markets. If those studies reveals bad information
about the patent substance, it allows the patentee to take steps that could avoid
costly liability suits, recall actions and the like. The empirical evidence could never
dismiss all instances of gridlock, but in the larger picture, gridlock is not a first order
question.
Walsh’s other findings are consistent with a high level of commercial activity,
which does not suggest gridlock. The use of “reach‐through” licenses that allow the
patent holder to collect royalties based on the revenues that a licensee receives from
its licenses makes good commercial sense. One of the greatest difficulties with
scientific research lies in the value of the licensed technology. The reach‐through
license avoids the need to make front‐end estimates of future revenues and thus
allows for the use of subsequent information to determine compensation at a later
date. Indeed, the recent decision of the United States Supreme Court in Quanta
Computer, Inc. v. LG Electronics, Inc.,100 curbing patent‐holder control of downstream
buyers of products embodying their patents, could easily undercut the flexibility of
licensing agreements in ways that could impede growth.101 Finally, the refusal to
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give information for free is no surprise in any commercial context, however
common it might, and should, be in connection with basic research. No firm is
required to share trade secrets under current law. But the introduction of forced
sharing agreements would achieve wider dissemination of information at the cost of
making it less likely that private individuals and firms would generate the
information in the first place. The empirical evidence thus does not support the view
that we have a crisis on our hands which research scientists somehow overlook.102
Fourth, it is critical to note how the expansion of research ties in with
stronger

patent protection.

The story of Compound X takes place against a

backdrop in which other firms had already developed the patented technologies
that this company wanted. But why were those products developed in the first
place? Heller is right to acknowledge that the expansion of ownership rights in
patented materials starting with Diamond v. Chakrabarty103 in 1980 led to the
infusion of huge amounts of investment into biomedical research.104 This illustrates
the positive side of the investment equation; exclusive rights spur innovation. In
addition, Heller makes one brief reference to the Bayh‐Dole Act,105 which requires
universities that receive government grants to pursue, if circumstances warrant it,
to patenting opportunities for their products with a view toward their
commercialization. In general, putting inventions into the public domain should be
expected to increase utilization because no one has to enter into any transactions to
utilize that material. There is ample reason why everyone agrees that mathematical
formulae and laws of nature always fall in the public domain no matter who
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discovers them. Some ask, why then use Bayh‐Dole to enhance privatization when it
necessarily increases the likelihood of some patent blockade?
It is hard to give a definitive answer to that question, but here is one
possibility. The commercialization of valuable compounds is expensive business.
Once a compound falls into the public domain, each company that seeks to
commercialize it is likely to keep its research activities secret, which means that
other potential participants in this space may be leery about moving into an already
crowded space. On the other hand, when a drug is patented, the firm with the
patent can eliminate one dimension of uncertainty from its calculation. To be sure,
it is only one dimension; no patentee can be sure whether some substitute
technology is in development and subject to trade secret law, or how well patentees
of other products are doing with their research on substitute products. However,
the additional flow of investment dollars into patent research from Bayh‐Dole
suggests that there must be at least some force in operation to account for the
spur.106

Indeed, the real concern today in many quarters is not with the

anticommons problem that stems from broad patented subject matter, but rather
from the distinct risk that the United States Supreme Court could well take steps to
cut back on the broadly supported Chakrabarty decision, with In Re Bilski,107 which
presents the Court with a dispute over the patentability of a risk‐hedging method
for commodities trading.
There are, moreover, good theoretical reasons to dispute Heller’s claim of
major patent gridlock. Bruce Kuhlik and I have argued that Heller and Eisenberg
106
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fundamentally misconceive the nature of the problem by treating the context of
drug innovation as though it involves the same political dynamics that are found in
permit cultures.108 More specifically, Heller’s own work refers to the corrupt permit
system that keeps storefronts empty in Moscow, Russia.109 After all in Russia its not
clear whom to bribe when initial bribe may not do much good if still other permits
are required down the road. Drugs don’t work that way. Unlike store fronts, drugs
are wasting assets, disappearing relentlessly over time. Either a firm enter into
deals quickly or it finds itself without a revenue stream. Under such circumstances,
parties work overtime to make sensible alliances dealing with anything from a
single product to an entire line of products. A patent pool, whereby patent holders
agree to license to one another, is of course one device that can mitigate holdup over
a wide range of patented technologies. But all patent pools are not created equal.
The current Department of Justice rules make good sense insofar as they are willing
to allow patent pools that contain complements yet are suspicious of pools that
contain product substitutes, which could become disguised cartelization subject to
the antitrust law.110
The Department of Justice position is a welcome change from earlier
government activities, which attacked procompetitive pooling arrangements under
the antitrust laws. Consider, again, the different configurations of toll booths on the
Rhine River. Those that are in series create problems, while those that are in
parallel do not. From the antitrust perspective, merger among different gatekeepers
operating in series should be welcomed, while mergers of different gatekeepers
operating in parallel should be subject to far greater scrutiny. Failure to recognize
that distinction in United Shoe Machinery led to 69 years of nonstop litigation by the
108
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United States against the firm, which had merged 30 different firms who held
sequential patents on various stages of the shoe manufacturing process.111 This
vertical merger was an effective device to eliminate a Rhine River problem. Over its
lifetime, it delivered great efficiencies to United Shoe’s customers, who never
complained about the excellent rates of service and the high levels of innovation,
which allowed United Shoe to keep a large market share. The great achievement of
the Department of Justice was to break up the firm into unsustainable units just
when foreign competition was heating up.112

The lesson here is that vertical

integration may be a sensible response to the patent holdup problem as is free entry
of new firms from overseas.
In this regard, moreover, the arrival of new patented technologies should
not be regarded as necessarily creating a thicker patent thicket. To revert to the
earlier images, the current patent map contains patents that operate both in series
and in parallel with each other. So the relevant question is whether the new patent
adds a new alternative or simply lengthens an established chain. The latter is odd
because, even with the new patent, businesses are free to use the strategies they
adopted before. On the other side, the arrival of a new patent could allow for an
alternative pathway to production that displaces several patents previously used in
series with each other. It is as though the new patent supplies an interstate highway
for a single toll, supplanting the maze of surface streets previously used. We know
that the rate of patent innovation continues to be strong, which could not be the
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case if the thicket were an obstacle and not an opportunity to production. The
Alzheimer’s Compound X story that Heller refers to, with all its infirmities, does not
seem to describe the overall state of the industry.
All this is not to say that we do not have instances in which the current
patent law has been misapplied in ways that block technical innovation. Let me
allude to two cases that raise these issues. The first has to do with the BRCA1 and
BRCA2 gene mutations dealing with breast‐cancer risk, which, as Heller rightly
points out, occupy a single patent that has impeded scientific research.113 The
particular complaint is that the exclusive use of the patent for the BRCA genes has
prevented other companies from using their (patented) “home‐brew” tests for
detecting the gene in situ. Obviously, the problem here is not gridlock, as he
acknowledges. The key point is that patent application should be rejected even
under the current law.
The fuller story goes as follows. As a matter of first principle, it looks as
though the BRCA genes are natural substances that are not patentable as “laws of
nature, physical phenomena, and abstract ideas.”114 An exception to that general
rule was developed as early as 1911 in ParkeDavis & Co. v. H. K. Mulford Co., in
which a Japanese scientist, Jokichi Takamine, had assigned to Parke‐Davis a patent
for the isolation and purification of adrenalin.115 No one doubted that the process
whereby the isolation and purification had taken place was protected. The novel
move in ParkeDavis was that Learned Hand sustained a patent for the composition
of matter, saying: “while it is of course possible logically to call this a purification of
the principle, it became for every practical purpose a new thing commercially and
therapeutically.”116 In effect, this decision meant that this patent could not be
circumvented by finding some alternative mode for isolation and purification, which
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of course increased its value. There is little doubt that the Hand decision paved the
way for the development of the highly valuable recombinant DNA technologies.117
The difference between this case and the BRCA genes is that Myriad Genetics
has asserted that its patent covers not only the sale of synthetic BRCA genes, but
also the use of that genetic site inside individual persons.118 This claim creates a
complete blockade against new invention because no one can invent around this
patent if the sole objective is to treat the conditions involving that genetic site. The
correct rule therefore should limit the ParkDavis decision to the cases involving
isolation and purification of a product for further sale, which is not at stake here.
The work that is needed to locate a gene is far less than it is to first locate and then
synthesize it. The blockade that results from this extended patent coverage is far
too broad. For these purposes a return to the traditional rule that it is not possible
to patent natural substances seems appropriate.
A second aspect of the full story neglected by Heller is the potential
patentability of gene fragments called “express sequence tags” (ESTs), used to
identify and map new genes, which some drug companies sought to patent in
droves. These claims were eventually rejected, and rightly so.119 To the extent
these ESTs are to be used in situ, the same objections derived in the context of the
BRCA genes apply. For use in the laboratory, the simple approach is that any
identification technique that can work by the boatload should be regarded as an
117
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obvious extension of existing technology that should not be patented.

One

interesting side note of the case rejecting the EST patents, In re Fisher, were the
steps taken by Merck, which favored an open access regime to develop its
complementary products. As Heller notes, Merck simply put its ESTs in the public
domain by the creation of a Gene Index, which took the steam out of the EST
movement.120

The moral of this tale, however, cuts in favor of strong patent

protection. It is easy for one key player to put something into the public domain. It
is much harder for any company to take something out of the public domain when
the patent laws are weak.
In sum, the legal rules governing the protection of patents are surely
imperfect, and always in need of improvement. However, there is no evidence that
we are in near‐crisis mode or that any radical reformation of the law of patents is
required at this time. Furthermore, there is strong reason to believe that the
weakening of patent protection, along a variety of dimensions, is in fact a serious
mistake.121
CONCLUSION
I believe that this lengthy review of THE GRIDLOCK ECONOMY leads to the
following overall evaluation of the work. Gridlock and anticommons are serious
issues that need to be addressed in any comprehensive examination of property
arrangements. But they must also be kept in perspective in at least 5 ways. First,
many of the serious distortions in the current economy have little or nothing to do
with gridlock. Just the massive programs of government subsidy in the health, real
estate, agricultural and energy markets are in aggregate far greater than the issues
here. Next, in many instances, as in labor and real estate markets, the government
takes an active, if perverse, role in the creation of economic gridlock, by offering
legal protection to monopolies (the labor case) or extensive permit powers to
government officials (the real estate case). In labor markets, the second area of
120
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error, a return to competitive structures could be accomplished easily if we had the
will to do it—which we don’t. In real estate markets, the third area, the massive
simplification of the permit process is possible so long as we are prepared to reduce
the class of externalities that we think call for public action and defer the granting of
remedies until these harms are imminent.

Once again, political rather than

intellectual issues are the largest impediments. Fourth, in other markets, most
notably markets in the broadcast spectrum, the true culprit is single government
ownership that can in no way be described as gridlock. And last, the complex
patterns of gridlock that from time to time appear in connection with intellectual
property rights, especially with patents, have to be put in perspective. At no point
could these be regarded as the sole source of uneasiness in the pharmaceutical
industry, given the other movements on pricing, liability, and clinical trials that have
impeded drug innovation. Even when the gridlock problem does arise it is often a
second order issue that pales in significance to the huge boost to investment that
strong property rights create in intellectual property. The bottom line therefore is
this: private property creates the occasional gridlock, but government ownership
and regulation create far more. Heller should therefore recognize that the second
half of his title does not follow from the first. Indeed he gets everything backwards.
The correct title is less spectacular but more accurate: The Gridlock Economy: How
Too Much Government Ownership and Regulation Wrecks Markets, Stops
Innovation, and Costs Lives.

47

Readers with comments should address them to:
Richard A. Epstein
University of Chicago Law School
1111 East 60th Street
Chicago, IL 60637
repstein@uchicago.edu

48

Chicago Working Papers in Law and Economics
(Second Series)
For a listing of papers 1–399 please go to Working Papers at http://www.law.uchicago.edu/Lawecon/index.html

400.
401.
402.
403.
404.
405.
406.

407.
408.
409.
410.
411.
412.
413.
414.
415.
416.
417.
418.
419.
420.
421.
422.
423.
424.
425.
426.
427.
428.
429.
430.
431.
432.
433.

Shyam Balganesh, Foreseeability and Copyright Incentives (April 2008)
Cass R. Sunstein and Reid Hastie, Four Failures of Deliberating Groups (April 2008)
M. Todd Henderson, Justin Wolfers and Eric Zitzewitz, Predicting Crime (April 2008)
Richard A. Epstein, Bell Atlantic v. Twombly: How Motions to Dismiss Become (Disguised)
Summary Judgments (April 2008)
William M. Landes and Richard A. Posner, Rational Judicial Behavior: A Statistical Study (April
2008)
Stephen J. Choi, Mitu Gulati, and Eric A. Posner, Which States Have the Best (and Worst) High
Courts? (May 2008)
Richard H. McAdams and Janice Nadler, Coordinating in the Shadow of the Law: Two
Contextualized Tests of the Focal Point Theory of Legal Compliance (May 2008, revised October
2008)
Cass R. Sunstein, Two Conceptions of Irreversible Environmental Harm (Mary 2008)
Richard A. Epstein, Public Use in a Post-Kelo World (June 2008)
Jonathan R. Nash, The Uneasy Case for Transjurisdictional Adjudication (June 2008)
Adam B. Cox and Thomas J. Miles, Documenting Discrimination? (June 2008)
M. Todd Henderson, Alan D. Jagolinzer, and Karl A. Muller, III, Scienter Disclosure (June 2008)
Jonathan R. Nash, Taxes and the Success of Non-Tax Market-Based Environmental Regulatory
Regimes (July 2008)
Thomas J. Miles and Cass R. Sunstein, Depoliticizing Administrative Law (June 2008)
Randal C. Picker, Competition and Privacy in Web 2.0 and the Cloud (June 2008)
Omri Ben-Shahar, The Myth of the “Opportunity to Read” in Contract Law (July 2008)
Omri Ben-Shahar, A Bargaining Power Theory of Gap-Filling (July 2008)
Omri Ben-Shahar, How to Repair Unconscionable Contracts (July 2008)
Richard A. Epstein and David A. Hyman, Controlling the Costs of Medical Care: A Dose of
Deregulation (July 2008)
Eric A. Posner, Erga Omnes Norms, Institutionalization, and Constitutionalism in International
Law (August 2008)
Thomas J. Miles and Eric A. Posner, Which States Enter into Treaties, and Why? (August 2008)
Cass R. Sunstein, Trimming (August 2008)
Cass R. Sunstein, Second Amendment Minimalism: Heller as Griswold (August 2008)
Richard A. Epstein, The Disintegration of Intellectual Property (August 2008)
John Bronsteen, Christopher Buccafusco, and Jonathan Masur, Happiness and Punishment
(August 2008)
Adam B. Cox and Thomas J. Miles, Judicial Ideology and the Transformation of Voting Rights
Jurisprudence (August 2008)
Daniel Abebe and Jonathan S. Masur, International Agreements and Internal Heterogeneity: The
“Two Chinas” Problem (August 2008; updated September 2009)
William Birdthistle and M. Todd Henderson, One Hat Too Many? Investment Desegregation in
Private Equity (August 2008)
Irina D. Manta, Privatizing Trademarks (abstract only) (September 2008)
Paul J. Heald, Testing the Over- and Under-Exploitation Hypothesis: Bestselling Musical
Compositions (1913–32) and Their Use in Cinema (1968–2007) (September 2008)
M. Todd Henderson and Richard A. Epstein, Introduction to “The Going Private Phenomenon:
Causes and Implications” (September 2008)
Paul Heald, Optimal Remedies for Patent Infringement: A Transactional Model (September 2008)
Cass R. Sunstein, Beyond Judicial Minimalism (September 2008)
Bernard E. Harcourt, Neoliberal Penality: The Birth of Natural Order, the Illusion of Free Markets
(September 2008)

49

434.
435.
436.
437.
438.
439.
440.
441.
442.
443.
444.
445.
446.
447.
448.
449.
450.
451.
452.
453.
454.
455.
456.
457.
458.
459.
460.
461.
462.
463.
464.
465.
466.
467.
468.
469.
470.
471.

Bernard E. Harcourt, Abolition in the U.S.A. by 2050: On Political Capital and Ordinary Acts of
Resistance (September 2008)
Robert Cooter and Ariel Porat, Liability for Lapses: First or Second Order Negligence? (October
2008)
Ariel Porat, A Comparative Fault in Defense Contract Law (October 2008)
Richard H. McAdams, Beyond the Prisoners’ Dilemma: Coordination, Game Theory and the Law
(October 2008)
Dhammika Dharamapala, Nuno Garoupa, and Richard H. McAdams, Belief in a Just World,
Blaming the Victim, and Hate Crime Satatutes (October 2008)
M. Todd Henderson, The Impotence of Delaware’s Taxes: A Short Response to Professor
Barzuza’s Delaware’s Compensation (October 2008)
Richard McAdams and Thomas Ulen, Behavioral Criminal Law and Economics (November 2008)
Cass R. Sunstein, Judging National Security post-9/11: An Empirical Investigation (November
2008)
Eric A. Posner and Adrian Vermuele, Crisis Governance in the Administrative State: 9/11 and the
Financial Meltdown of 2008 (November 2008)
Lee Anne Fennell, Adjusting Alienability (November 2008)
Nuno Garoupa and Tom Ginsburg, Guarding the Guardinas: Judicial Councils and Judicial
Independence (November 2008)
Richard A. Epstein, The Many Faces of Fault in Contract Law: Or How to Do Economics Right,
without Really Trying (December 2008)
Cass R. Sunstein and Richard Zeckhauser, Overreaction to Fearsome Risks (December 2008)
Gilbert Metcalf and David Weisbach, The Design of a Carbon Tax (January 2009)
David A. Weisbach, Responsibility for Climate Change, by the Numbers (January 2009)
M. Todd Henderson, Two Visions of Corporate Law (January 2009)
Oren Bar-Gill and Omri Ben-Shahar, An Information Theory of Willful Breach (January 2009)
Tom Ginsburg, Public Choice and Constitutional Design (January 2009)
Richard Epstein, The Case against the Employee Free Choice Act (January 2009)
Adam B. Cox, Immigration Law’s Organizing Principles (February 2009)
Philip J. Cook, Jens Ludwig, and Adam M. Samaha, Gun Control after Heller: Threats and
Sideshows from a Social Welfare Perspective (February 2009)
Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, The Right to Abandon (February 2009)
M. Todd Henderson, The Nanny Corporation and the Market for Paternalism (February 2009)
Lee Anne Fennell, Commons, Anticommons, Semicommons (February 2009)
Richard A. Epstein and M. Todd Henderson, Marking to Market: Can Accounting Rules Shake the
Foundations of Capitalism? (April 2009)
Eric A. Posner and Luigi Zingales, The Housing Crisis and Bankruptcy Reform: The Prepackaged
Chapter 13 Approach (April 2009)
Stephen J. Choi, G. Mitu Gulati, and Eric A. Posner, Are Judges Overpaid? A Skeptical Response
to the Judicial Salary Debate (April 2009)
Adam B. Cox and Eric A. Posner, The Rights of Migrants (April 2009)
Randal C. Picker, The Google Book Search Settlement: A New Orphan-Works Monopoly? (April
2009, revised July 2009)
Randal C. Picker, The Mediated Book (May 2009)
Anupam Chander, Corporate Law’s Distributive Design (June 2009)
Anupam Chander, Trade 2.0 (June 2009)
Lee Epstein, William M. Landes, and Richard A. Posner, Inferring the Winning Party in the
Supreme Court from the Pattern of Questioning at Oral Argument (June 2009)
Eric A Posner, Kathryn Spier, and Adrian Vermeule, Divide and Conquer (June 2009)
John Bronsteen, Christopher J. Buccafucso, and Jonathan S. Masur, Welfare as Happiness (June
2009)
Richard A. Epstein and Amanda M. Rose, The Regulation of Soveriegn Wealth Funds: The
Virtues of Going Slow (June 2009)
Douglas G. Baird and Robert K. Rasmussen, Anti-Bankruptcy (June 2009)
Bernard E. Harcourt, Alon Harel, Ken Levy, Michael M. O’Hear, and Alice Ristroph,
Randomization in Criminal Justice: A Criminal Law Conversation (June 2009)

50

472.
473.
474.
475.
476.
477.
478.
479.
480.
481.
482.
483.
484.
485.
486.
487.
488.
489.
490.
491.
492.
493.
494.
495.

Bernard E. Harcourt, Neoliberal Penality: A Brief Genealogy (June 2009)
Lee Anne Fennell, Willpower and Legal Policy (June 2009)
Richard A. Epstein, How to Undermine Tax Increment Financing: The Lessons of ProLogis v.
City of Chicago (June 2009)
Randal C. Picker, Online Advertising, Identity and Privacy (June 2009)
M. Todd Henderson, Credit Derivatives Are Not “Insurance” (July 2009)
Lee Anne Fennell and Julie Roin, Controlling Residential Stakes (July 2009)
Douglas G. Baird, The Holmesian Bad Man’s First Critic (August 2009)
Douglas G. Baird, The Bankruptcy Exchange (August 2009)
Jonathan Masur and Eric A. Posner, Against Feasibility Analysis (August 2009)
Lee Anne Fennell, The Unbounded Home, Property Values beyond Property Lines (August 2009)
Bernard E. Harcourt, Henry Louis Gates and Racial Profiling: What’s the Problem? (September
2009)
Stephen J. Choi, Mitu Gulati, Mirya Holman, and Eric A. Posner, Judging Women (September
2009)
Omri Ben-Shahar, One-Way Contracts: Consumer Protection without Law (October 2009)
Ariel Porat, Expanding Liability for Negligence Per Se (October 2009)
Ariel Porat and Alex Stein, Liability for Future Harm (October 2009)
Anup Malani and Ramanan Laxminrayan, Incentives for Surveillance of Infectious Disease
Outbreaks (October 2009)
Anup Malani, Oliver Bembom and Mark van der Laan, Accounting for Differences among
Patients in the FDA Approval Process (October 2009)
David Gilo and Ariel Porat, Viewing Unconsconability through a Market Lens (October 2009)
David Weisbach, Instrument Choice Is Instrument Design (October 2009)
M. Todd Henderson, Justifying Jones (November 2009)
ProCD v. Zeidenberg and Cognitive Overload in Contractual Bargaining (November 2009)
Randal C. Picker, Antitrust and Innovation: Framing Baselines in the Google Book Search
Settlement (November 2009)
Richard A. Epstein, Against Permititis: Why Volunteer Organizations Should Regulate the Use of
Cancer Drugs (November 2009)
Richard A. Epstein, Heller’s Gridlock Economy in Perspective: Why There Is Too Little, Not Too
Much, Private Property (November 2009)

51

